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Abstract
There is a growing interest in the use of video sensor networks in surveillance
applications in order to detect intruders with low cost. The essential concern of
such networks is whether or not a specified target can pass or intrude the monitored
region without being detected. This concern forms a serious challenge to wireless
video sensor networks of weak computation and battery power.
In this paper, our aim is to prolong the whole network lifetime while fulfill-
ing the surveillance application needs. We present a novel scheduling algorithm
where only a subset of video nodes contribute significantly to detect intruders and
prevent malicious attacker to predict the behavior of the network prior to intrusion.
Our approach is chaos-based, where every node based on its last detection, a hash
value and some pseudo-random numbers easily computes a decision function to
go to sleep or active mode. We validate the efficiency of our approach through
theoretical analysis and demonstrate the benefits of our scheduling algorithm by
simulations. Results show that in addition of being able to increase the whole
network lifetime and to present comparable results against random attacks (low
stealth time), our scheme is also able to withstand malicious attacks due to its fully
unpredictable behavior.
1 Introduction
Instead of using traditional vision systems built essentially from fixed video cameras,
it is possible to deploy autonomous and small wireless video sensor nodes (WVSN) [1]
to achieve video surveillance of a given area of interest. Doing so lead to a much higher
level of flexibility, therefore extending the range of surveillance applications that could
be considered. More interestingly, this scenario can support dynamic deployment sce-
nario even in so-called object and obstacle-rich environments or hard-to-access areas.
Such wireless video sensor nodes can in addition be thrown in mass to constitute a
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large scale surveillance infrastructure. In these scenarios, hundreds or thousands of
video nodes of low capacity (resolution, processing, and storage) of a same or similar
type can be deployed in an area of interest.
Surveillance applications have very specific needs due to their inherently critical
nature associated to security [2, 3, 4]. The basic objective of video surveillance sys-
tems is to allow detection and/or identification of intruders. Therefore, in that context,
the main goal of a video sensor network is to ensure the coverage of the whole area of
interest at any time t. Another issue of prime importance is related to energy consid-
erations since the scarcity of energy does have a direct impact on coverage, as it is not
possible to have all the video nodes in activity at the same time. Therefore, a common
approach is to define a subset of the deployed nodes to be active while the other nodes
can sleep. There are already some techniques that schedule video nodes to work al-
ternatively while maintaining the complete coverage [5, 6, 7]. The main idea in these
techniques is to turn off a redundant node. Here redundancy means that the covered
area by a node is completely covered by its neighbors too. However, these techniques
usually depend on location or directional information, which is costly in energy and
complexity. Usually it is very difficult to determine the redundant nodes without the
location information. Fortunately, not all applications need a complete coverage at any-
time, and in most surveillance applications for intrusion detection, most sensor nodes
can move to a so-called “idle mode” in the absence of intrusions. When an intruder is
detected by a node all the network will be alerted. In that context, it is critical to pro-
vide an effective scheme for turning off video nodes without degrading the surveillance
quality.
In this paper, we present a solution to the joint scheduling problem in surveillance
applications using video sensor nodes. We provide a chaotic sleeping scheme and con-
duct a theoretical and simulation analysis of both performances and security. Until
now, only random approaches have been extensively studied in the literature to turn off
video nodes without degrading the surveillance quality. Even if such methods present
good scores in detecting random intrusions while preserving the lifetime of the net-
work, they do not encompass the situation of a malicious attacker. That is to say, the
intruder is not supposed to know something about the surveillance scheme, he cannot
observe the WVSN for a while, or he is not authorized to deduce anything from his pos-
sible knowledge. In this paper, we intend to tackle with situations where the attacker
is not supposed passive: he is smart and does not necessarily choose a random way to
achieve his intrusion. In addition of preserving the network lifetime and being able to
face random attacks, we show that our scheme is also capable to withstand attacks of a
malicious adversary due to its unpredictable behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related works related
to surveillance applications with WVSN are presented. Smart threats and malicious
attackers are introduced in Section 3. Basic recalls and terminologies on the fields of
the mathematical theory of chaos and chaotic iterations are given in Section 4, and
the link unifying them is explained too. The surveillance scheme based on the chaos
theory is detailed in Section 5. We show in Section 6 that our proposed scheme can be
used against malicious attacks. Simulation results in Section 7 compare our scheme to
the classical random schedule in terms of intruder’s stealth time, network lifetime and
energy repartition. The paper ends by a conclusion section, where our contribution is
summed up and planned future work is detailed.
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2 Related Works
In video sensor networks, minimizing energy consumption and prolonging the system
lifetime are major design objectives. Due to the significant energy-saving when a node
is sleeping, a frequently used mechanism is to schedule the sensor nodes such that
redundant nodes go to sleep as often and for as long as possible. By selecting only a
subset of nodes to be active and keeping the remaining nodes in a sleep state, the energy
consumption of the network is reduced, thereby extending the operational lifetime of
the sensor network.
In this context, the coverage problem for wireless video sensor networks can be
categorized as:
• Known-Targets Coverage Problem, which seeks to determine a subset of con-
nected video nodes that covers a given set of target-locations scattered in a 2D
plane.
• Region-Coverage Problem, which aims to find a subset of connected video nodes
that ensures the coverage of the entire region of deployment in a 2D plane.
Most of the previous works have considered the known-targets coverage prob-
lem [8, 9, 10, 11]. The objective is to ensure at all time the coverage of some targets
with known locations that are deployed in a two-dimensional plane. For example, the
authors in [11] organize sensor nodes into mutually exclusive subsets that are activated
successively, where the size of each subset is restricted and not all of the targets need to
be covered by the sensors in one subset. In [9], a directional sensor model is proposed,
where a sensor is allowed to work in several directions. The idea behind this is to find a
minimal set of directions that can cover the maximum number of targets. It is different
from the approach described in [8] that aims to find a group of non-disjoint cover sets,
each set covering all the targets to maximize the network lifetime.
Regarding the Region-Coverage Problem in which this study takes place, existing
works focus on finding an efficient deployment pattern so that the average overlapping
area of each sensor is bounded. The authors in [12] analyze new deployment strate-
gies for satisfying some given coverage probability requirements with directional sens-
ing models. A model of directed communications is introduced to ensure and repair
the network connectivity. Based on a rotatable directional sensing model, the authors
in [13] present a method to deterministically estimate the amount of directional nodes
for a given coverage rate. A sensing connected sub-graph accompanied with a convex
hull method is introduced to model a directional sensor network into several parts in a
distributed manner. With adjustable sensing directions, the coverage algorithm tries to
minimize the overlapping sensing area of directional sensors only with local topology
information. Lastly, in [6], the authors present a distributed algorithm that ensures both
coverage of the deployment area and network connectivity, by providing multiple cover
sets to manage Field of View redundancies and reduce objects disambiguation.
All the above algorithms depend on the geographical location information (position
and direction) of video nodes. These algorithms aim to provide a complete-coverage
network so that any point in the target area would be covered by at least one video
node. However, this strategy is not as energy-efficient as what we expect because of
the following two reasons. Firstly, the energy cost and system complexity involved
in obtaining geometric information may compromise the effect of those algorithms.
Secondly, video nodes located at the edge of the area of interest must be always in an
active state as long as the region is required to be completely covered. These video
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nodes will die after some time and their coverage area will be left without surveillance.
Thus, the network coverage area will shrink gradually from outside to inside. This
condition is unacceptable in video surveillance applications and intrusion detection,
because the major goal here is to detect intruders as they cross a border or as they
penetrate a protected area.
One direction to solve these problems is to schedule a node to sleep following a
probabilistic approach. Each node remains awake with a given probability so that the
coverage of the area can be guaranteed. However the probability can be modeled by
an observer, who can take benefits from his observations to predict the dynamic of
the network. This is obviously a security flaw. These considerations lead us to the
introduction of smart threats given in the next section.
3 Smart Threats
3.1 Introduction
Let us suppose that an adversary tries to reach a location X into the area without being
detected. We consider that this situation leads to two categories of attacks against
WVSN surveillance.
On the one hand, the attacker only knows that the area is under surveillance. He
tries to take its chance, for example by following the shortest way or by trying a random
path. In this first category of attack that we call “blind elementary attacks”, the intruder
does not know how the surveillance is achieved as he does not observe the WVSN.
On the other hand, in the second category of attacks, called “malicious attacks” in
this paper, the intruder is supposed to be intelligent. He can try to take benefits from
his observations to understand the behavior of the WVSN. After having recorded the
dynamic of the WVSN for a given time, the malicious intruder can try to determine
when video nodes are turned on. This prediction can help the intruder to find a way to
reach X without being detected.
In our opinion, the most reasonable way to evaluate the consequences of a malicious
attack is to suppose that the intruder has access to the surveillance scheme. With this
supposition, our security model encompasses the case where an attacker can have a
physical access to a given node, thus determining the embedded mechanism used for
video surveillance. In this Kerckhoffs-based principle, the attacker knows all but the
initial parameters of the nodes. Moreover, he can observe the WVSN for a while. To
achieve his intrusion, he can use all of the acquired knowledge – the sole difficulty is
his lack of a secret parameter (the secret key) used to initialize the surveillance process.
The context of blind elementary attacks is well-known and understood: it has been
studied a lot in the last decade, and various solutions have yet been proposed (Section
2). On the contrary, to the best of our knowledge, the case of an intelligent intruder
(smart threat) has not yet really been treated. In this paper, we intend to propose a
scheme able to withstand attacks encompassing these malicious intrusions, and thus to
offer a first solution to the problem raised by the smart threats existence hypothesis.
Technically speaking, the proposed approach offers several benefits. Firstly, the
node scheduling algorithm does not need location information. Therefore, the energy
consumption is reduced because there is no need to locate the node itself and its neigh-
bors. Secondly, we will show that it performs as well as a random scheduling, in terms
of lifetime and intrusion detection against blind elementary attacks (see Section 7).
Lastly, due to its chaotic properties, its coverage is unpredictable, and thus a malicious
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adversary has no solution to attack the network (Section 6).
3.2 Classification of Malicious Attacks
When a malicious adversary attacks a WVSN, he can concentrate his efforts either on
the global network or on some specific nodes. Depending on the considered situation,
he can perform either an active attack, modifying the network architecture or a node,
or a passive attack based only on observations. He can have access to several WVSN
using the same algorithm. Furthermore, he can build its own network to make some
experiments. His objective is to find the secret key used in the targeted network: with
this knowledge, the attacker will be able to predict the behavior of the video sensor
nodes.
Active attacks have been already investigated several times in the literature. These
studies encompass the cases where nodes can be added, moved, modified, or removed,
where communications between nodes can be observed or modified, and where the
global architecture of the network is attacked. However, some WVSN are such that
any modification of the network is signaled, leading to the impossibility of such active
attacks. On the contrary, passive observations and deductions of a malicious attacker
are always possible. To the best of our knowledge, these threats have not yet been
investigated.
The passive malicious attacks can be classified as follows.
• In the Target Only Attack (TOA), the adversary can only observe targeted net-
works.
• In the Constant Key Attack (CKA), the adversary has access to several WVSN
using the same secret key. The areas under surveillance and the network archi-
tecture change from one WVSN to another, but the attacker knows that all these
networks use the same algorithm with the same secret key.
• In the Known Original Attack (KOA), the attacker had previously accessed to
the WVSN and its area. He had the opportunity to test various keys in a previous
access. He hopes that this knowledge will help him to determine a way to realize
his intrusion when the WVSN is really launched.
• In the Chosen Key Attack (CKA), the adversary has access to an exact copy
of the network and area under surveillance than the one he want to attack. He
has realized for instance a miniature model or a computer simulator having ex-
actly the same behavior than the targeted network and its area. He can thus try
several secret key, and if he achieves to reproduce exactly the same behavior for
the network, then he can reasonably suppose that the true secret key has been
discovered.
• Finally, in the Estimated Original Attack (EOA), the attacker has only an esti-
mation, an approximation of the network and its area.
In each of these categories, the sole objective of the attacker is to obtain the value
of the secret key. With this knowledge, he will able to determine the WVSN behavior,
finding by doing so a way to achieve his intrusion.
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3.3 Security Levels in CKA
We now take place in the Chosen Key Attack problem. Let k0 be the secret key used to
initiate the video-surveillance. Denote by Yk the probabilistic model that the attacker
can build with his observations, and by K the set of all possible keys.
Definition 1 (Insecurity) The WVSN is insecure against the Target Only Attack if and
only if ∃k1 ∈ K, p(Yk1) = p(Yk0) and ∀k2 ∈ K, p(Yk2) 6= p(Yk0)
On the contrary,
Definition 2 (Security) The WVSN is secure against the Target Only Attack if and only
if ∀k ∈ K, p(Yk) = p(Yk0)
In that situation, it is easy to prove that the mutual information I(k0, Yk0) is equal
to 0, which is often refered as perfect secrecy.
4 Basic Recalls
In the sequel Sn denotes the n−th term of a sequence S and Vi is the i−th component
of a vector V . fk = f ◦ ... ◦ f denotes the k−th composition of a function f . Finally,
the following notation is used: J1;NK = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
4.1 Devaney’s Chaotic Dynamical Systems
Consider a topological space (X , τ) and a continuous function f : X → X .
Definition 3 f is said to be topologically transitive if, for any pair of open sets U, V ⊂
X , there exists k > 0 such that fk(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Definition 4 An element (a point) x is a periodic element (point) for f of period n ∈
N∗, if fn(x) = x.
Definition 5 f is said to be regular on (X , τ) if the set of periodic points for f is dense
in X : for any point x in X , any neighborhood of x contains at least one periodic point
(without necessarily the same period).
Definition 6 f is said to be chaotic on (X , τ) if f is regular and topologically transi-
tive.
The chaos property is strongly linked to the notion of “sensitivity”, defined on a
metric space (X , d) by:
Definition 7 f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions if there exists δ > 0 such
that, for any x ∈ X and any neighborhood V of x, there exists y ∈ V and n > 0 such
that d (fn(x), fn(y)) > δ. δ is called the constant of sensitivity of f .
Indeed, Banks et al. have proven in [14] that when f is chaotic and (X , d) is a
metric space, then f has the property of sensitive dependence on initial conditions (this
property was formerly an element of the definition of chaos). To sum up, quoting De-
vaney in [15], a chaotic dynamical system “is unpredictable because of the sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. It cannot be broken down or simplified into two sub-
systems which do not interact because of topological transitivity. And in the midst of
this random behavior, we nevertheless have an element of regularity”. Fundamentally
different behaviors are consequently possible and occur in an unpredictable way.
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4.2 Chaotic Iterations
Let us consider a system of a finite number N ∈ N∗ of elements (or cells), so that
each cell has a Boolean state. A sequence of length N of Boolean states of the cells
corresponds to a particular state of the system. A sequence which elements are subsets
of J1;NK is called a strategy. The set of all strategies is denoted by S.
Definition 8 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→ BN be a function and S ∈ S
be a strategy. The so-called chaotic iterations (CIs) are defined by [16] x0 ∈ BN and
∀n ∈ N∗,∀i ∈ J1;NK, xni = { xn−1i if i /∈ Sn(f(xn−1))
Sn
if i ∈ Sn. (1)
In other words, at the n−th iteration, only the Sn−th cell is “iterated”.
Note that in a more general formulation, Sn can be a subset of components and
f(xn−1)Sn can be replaced by f(xk)Sn , where k < n, describing for example, delays
transmission. For the general definition of such chaotic iterations, see, e.g., [16].
The term “chaotic”, in the name of these iterations, has a priori no link with
the mathematical theory of chaos recalled previously. However, we have proven in
[17] that in a relevant metric space (X , d), the vectorial negation f0(x1, . . . , xN) =
(x1, . . . , xN) satisfies the three conditions for Devaney’s chaos. This result is recalled
in the next section.
4.3 Chaotic Iterations and Devaney’s Chaos
Denote by ∆ the discrete Boolean metric, ∆(x, y) = 0 ⇔ x = y. Given a function
f : BN −→ BN, define the function Ff : J1;NK×BN −→ BN such that
Ff (k,E) =
(
Ej .∆(k, j) + f(E)k.∆(k, j)
)
j∈J1;NK , (2)
where + and . are the Boolean addition and product operations. The shift function is
defined by σ : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S → (Sn+1)n∈N ∈ S and the initial function i is the map
which associates to a sequence, its first term: i : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S→ S0 ∈ J1;NK.
Consider the phase space: X = J1;NKN ×BN and the map
Gf (S,E) = (σ(S), Ff (i(S), E)) . (3)
The chaotic iterations can be described by the following iterations{
X0 ∈ X
Xk+1 = Gf (X
k).
(4)
Let us define a new distance between two points (S,E), (Sˇ, Eˇ) ∈ X by
d((S,E); (Sˇ, Eˇ)) = de(E, Eˇ) + ds(S, Sˇ), (5)
where
• de(E, Eˇ) =
N∑
k=1
∆(Ek, Eˇk) ∈ J0;NK,
• ds(S, Sˇ) =
9
N
∞∑
k=1
|Sk − Sˇk|
10k
∈ [0; 1].
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This new distance has been introduced in [18, 17] to satisfy the following require-
ments. When the number of different cells between two systems is increasing, then
their distance should increase too. In addition, if two systems present the same cells
and their respective strategies start with the same terms, then the distance between these
two points must be small because the evolution of the two systems will be the same for
a while. The distance presented above follows these recommendations. Indeed, if the
floor value bd(X,Y )c is equal to n, then the systemsE, Eˇ differ in n cells. In addition,
d(X,Y )−bd(X,Y )c is a measure of the differences between strategies S and Sˇ. More
precisely, this floating part is less than 10−k if and only if the first k terms of the two
strategies are equal. Moreover, if the k−th digit is nonzero, then the k−th terms of the
two strategies are different.
It is proven in [18, 17] by using the sequential continuity that,
Proposition 1 ∀N ∈ N∗,∀f : BN → BN, Gf is a continuous function on (X , d).
It is then checked in [18, 17] that in the metric space (X , d), the vectorial nega-
tion f0(x1, . . . , xN) = (x1, . . . , xN) satisfies the three conditions for Devaney’s chaos:
regularity, transitivity, and sensitivity. This has led to the following result.
Proposition 2 CIs are chaotic on (X , d) as it is defined by Devaney.
These chaotic iterations have been used to define in [17] an hash function and a
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) able to pass the stringent TestU01 battery
of tests in [19].
5 Chaos-Based Scheduling
5.1 The General Algorithm
5.1.1 Network Capabilities
The WVSN is supposed to be constituted by 2N nodes Vi, i ∈ J0, 2N − 1K. Each Vi is
able to wake up on a specific signal, to survey a given area (and to detect intrusions),
to send a wake up signal to another node Vj , and to go to sleep when it is required.
Furthermore, it is supposed that Vi embeds:
• The mechanisms required by the intrusion detection: a sensing function ci(t),
such as a camera, which returns some digital data at each listening time, and a
decision function di(c) which returns if an intrusion is detected in this sensing
values (ci(t)) or not.
• An internal clock having the time Ti = riT0 as a reference.
• A vector of N binary digits, called the state of the system Vi, and the capability
to swap each bit of this vector (0↔ 1).
• An integer ei, called listening time, initialized to 0.
In other words, each node Vi can achieve CIs. Thus, each node can compute, easily
and by using a few resources, a hash value and some pseudo-random numbers as it is
recalled in Section 4.2. We will denote by gi the seed of the PRNG used in node Vi,
which is equal to a secret parameter pi at time t = 0.
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5.1.2 Deploying the Network
The deployment of video sensor nodes in the physical environment is the first operation
(step) in the network lifecycle. It may take several forms. Sensor nodes may be ran-
domly deployed dropping them from a plane, and placed one by one by a human or a
robot. Deployment may be a one time activity or a continuous process. These methods
have been extensively studied in the literature. In our method, the sole requirement to
satisfy is to guarantee the uniform repartition into the region of interest.
5.1.3 Initialization of the WVSN
At time t = 0, a subset I ⊂ J0, 2N − 1K of nodes are woken up and ∀i ∈ I, et0i = Ti.
5.1.4 Surveillance
The principle of surveillance applications is defined as follows. At each time tj =
j × T0, j = 1, 2, . . .:
1. If a sleeping node Vi has received n
tj−1
i > 1 wake up orders during the time
interval [tj − 1, tj ], then it goes into active mode and sets its listening time etji
to ntj−1i Ti.
2. If an active node Vi has received n
tj−1
i > 1 orders to wake up during the time
interval [tj−1, tj ], then it increments its listening time: e
tj
i = e
tj−1
i + n
tj−1
i Ti.
3. For each node Vi having a listening time e
tj
i 6= 0:
• Vi ensures the surveillance of its area during T0,
• If, during this time interval, an intrusion is detected, then the WVSN is
under alert.
• If tj is the first listening time of Vi after having activated, then:
– The hash value htji of the sensed value ci(tj) is computed (cf. Sec-
tion 4.2).
– The seed gi of the PRNG of Vi is set to h
tj
i + tj , where + is the
concatenation of the digits of htji and tj (thus even if h
tj
i = h
tk
i , k < j,
we have gtji 6= gtki ).
– The N bits of the state of the system Vi are set to E
tj
i , where E
tj
i is the
binary decomposition of i shown as a binary vector of length N.
4. N bits are computed with the PRNG of Vi. These bits define an integer S
tj
i ∈J0, 2N−1K. Then the bit of Etji in position Stji is switched, which leads to a new
state Etj+1i . By doing so, CIs are realized.
5. Each active node Vi decreases its listening time: e
tj
i = e
tj
i − 1.
6. For each active node having its listening time etji = 0:
• Vi sends the wake up order to node Vk, where k ∈ J0, 2N−1K is the integer
whose binary decomposition is the last state of the system Vi (E
tj+1
i ).
• Vi goes to sleep.
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6 Theoretical Study
6.1 Scheduling as Chaotic Iterations
The scheduling scheme presented above can be described as CIs. The global state Et
of the whole system is constituted by the reunion of each internal state Eti of each node
i. This is an element of BN×2
N
. The strategy at time t is the subset of J0;N × 2NK
constituted by all of the strategies that are computed into the awaken nodes at time t.
More precisely, if the node Vk has computed the strategy Stk at time t, then the global
strategy St will contain the value Stk + k × N. Lastly, the iteration function is the
vectorial negation defined : BN×2
N → BN×2N . A subsequence Emt is extracted from
Et, which determines the changes that occur in the network: nodes whose binary id is
into Em
t
are nodes that achieve the surveillance at the considered time. Let us remark
that Sk and mk depend both on the outside world, due to the fact that Sti are regularly
seeded with the digest of some sensed values.
6.2 Complexity
Even if the hash function and the PRNG taken from [17] and [19] respectively can
be replaced by any cryptographically secure hash function and PRNG, we do not rec-
ommend their substitution. Indeed, all of the operations used by our scheme can be
achieved by CIs. Each iteration of CIs is only constituted by the negation of a few
binary digits. Obviously, such an operation is fast and does not consume a lot of en-
ergy. By doing so, we thus obtain an efficient video surveillance scheduling scheme
compliant with WVSN requirements. Section 7 will detail more quantitatively this fact.
6.3 Coverage
The coverage of the whole area is guaranteed due to the following reasons.
Firstly, the scheduling process corresponds to CIs. These iterations are chaotic
according to Devaney, thus they are transitive. This transitivity property is the formu-
lation of an uniform distribution in terms of topology. It claims that the system will
never stop to visit any sub-region of the whole area, regardless of how tiny the region
is.
Secondly, as the choice of the nodes to wake up at each time are done by using CIs,
this selection corresponds to the returned value of our PRNG proposed in [19]. This
“CI(X,Y)-generator” takes two PRNGs X,Y as input sequences, realizes CIs with X as
strategy, the vectorial negation as update function, and selects the states to publish as
outputs by using the second PRNG Y. By such a combination, we improve the statistical
properties of the input PRNG used as strategy, and we add chaotic properties. The
scheduling process corresponds to the CI(X,Y)-generator, with X=m and Y=S. As
Y is statistically perfect (Y is CI(ISAAC,ISAAC), which can pass the whole NIST,
DieHARD, and TestU01 batteries of tests), the uniform repartition of the states is then
guaranteed.
Lastly, experiments of Section 7 will show that this intended uniform coverage is
well obtained in practice.
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6.4 Security Study
6.4.1 Qualitative Approach
Let us suppose that Oscar, an intruder, knows that the scheduling process is based on
CIs, i.e. he knows the whole algorithm, except the seeds that have been used to initiate
the PRNGs of each node. By doing so, we respect the Kerckhoffs’ principle: the
adversary has all except the secret key. Oscar’s desire is to reach a particular location
X of the area without being detected. To achieve his goal, he can choose two strategies.
On the one hand, he can try a blind elementary attack, either by following a random
way from its position to X , of by choosing the shortest path. The next subsection and
the experiments will show that such an attack cannot work. On the other hand, Oscar
can try to take benefits both from his knowledge and his observations. However, if he
can determine the nodes that are awaken at time t, he cannot predict the awaken nodes
at time t+ 1, t+ 2, ... To do so, he should be able to obtain St+1, St+2, ..., which are
computed from the digests of some values that will be sensed in the future. As our
hash function satisfy the avalanche effect, due to its chaotic properties, any error on the
sensed value lead to a completely different digest.
As Oscar cannot determine the sensed values of each node, at each time and with
an infinite precision, he does not have the knowledge of the current state of the global
system. He has only access to an approximation of this state. As the global scheduling
process is chaotic, this error on the initial condition is magnified at each iteration,
leading to the impossibility for Oscar to predict the scheduling process. This qualitative
approach for security will be formalized in the second section below.
6.4.2 Chaotic Properties
We now investigate the topological properties presented by the proposed video-surveillance
scheme. First of all, let us recall two fundamental definitions from the mathematical
theory of chaos.
Definition 9 A function f is said to be expansive if ∃ε > 0, ∀x 6= y, ∃n ∈ N such
that d (fn(x), fn(y)) ≥ ε.
Definition 10 A discrete dynamical system is said to be topologically mixing if and
only if, for any pair of disjoint open sets U ,V 6= ∅, n0 ∈ N can be found so that
∀n ≥ n0, fn(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
As proven in [20], chaotic iterations are expansive and topologically mixing when
f is the vectorial negation f0. Consequently, these properties are inherited by the
WVSN presented previously, which induce a greater unpredictability. Any difference
on the initial parameter of the WVSN is in particular magnified up to be equal to the
expansivity constant.
Now, what are the consequences for a wireless sensor network to be chaotic ac-
cording to Devaney’s definition? Firstly, the topological transitivity property implies
indecomposability.
Definition 11 A dynamical system (X , f) is indecomposable if it is not the union of
two closed sets A,B ⊂ X such that f(A) ⊂ A, f(B) ⊂ B.
Hence, reducing the observed area in order to simplify its complexity, is impossible if
Γ(f) is strongly connected. Moreover, under this hypothesis the surveillance scheme
is strongly transitive:
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Definition 12 A dynamical system (X , f) is strongly transitive if ∀x, y ∈ X , ∀r > 0,
∃z ∈ X , d(z, x) ≤ r ⇒ ∃n ∈ N∗, fn(z) = y.
According to this definition, for all pair of points x, y in the phase space, a point z
can be found in the neighborhood of x such that one of its iterate fn(z) is y. Indeed,
this result has been stated during the proof of the transitivity presented in [17]. Among
other things, the strong transitivity leads to the fact that without the knowledge of the
initial awaken nodes, all scheduling are possible. Additionally, no nodes of the output
space can be discarded when studying the video-surveillance scheme: this space is
intrinsically complicated and it cannot be decomposed or simplified.
Finally, these WVSN possess the instability property:
Definition 13 A dynamical system (X , f) is unstable if for all x ∈ X , the orbit γx :
n ∈ N 7−→ fn(x) is unstable, that means: ∃ε > 0, ∀δ > 0, ∃y ∈ X , ∃n ∈ N, such
that d(x, y) < δ and d (γx(n), γy(n)) ≥ ε.
This property, which is implied by sensitive point dependence on initial conditions,
leads to the fact that in all neighborhoods of any point x there are points that can be
apart by ε in the future through iterations of the WVSN. Thus, we can claim that the
behavior of these networks is unstable when Γ(f) is strongly connected.
6.4.3 Cryptanalysis in CKA Framework
As stated in Section 6.1, the proposed videosurveillance scheme can be rewritten as:{
X0 ∈ X
Xk+1 = Gf0(X
k),
(6)
where the phase space is X = J1;N × 2NKN × BN×2N and f0 stands for the vectorial
negation on BN×2
N
.
We will now show that,
Proposition 3 The videosurveillance scheme proposed in this document is secure when
facing a chosen key attack.
Proof 1 Let N = N × 2N. We suppose that X ∼ U (BN), that is, X is uni-
formly distributed into BN . We will prove by a mathematical induction that ∀n ∈
N, Xn ∼ U (BN). The base case is immediate, as X0 = X ∼ U (BN). Let us
now suppose that the statement Xn ∼ U (BN) holds for some n. Let e ∈ BN and
Bk = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ BN (the digit 1 is in position k). So P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
=∑N
k=1 P (X
n = e+Bk, S
n = k) . These two events are independent, thus: P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
=∑N
k=1 P (X
n = e+Bk)×P (Sn = k). According to the inductive hypothesis: P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
=
1
2N
∑N
k=1 P (S
n = k). The set of events {Sn = k} for k ∈ J1;NK is a partition of the
universe of possible, so
∑N
k=1 P (S
n = k) = 1.
Finally, P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
= 1
2N
, which leads to Xn+1 ∼ U (BN). This result is
true ∀n ∈ N, we thus have proven that,
∀K ∈ [0; 1], YK = XN0 ∼ U
(
BN
)
when X ∼ U (BN)
So the videosurveillance defined in this paper is secure in CKA.
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Figure 1: Percentage of active nodes.
7 Simulation Results
This section presents simulation results on comparing our chaotic approach to the stan-
dard C++ rand()-based approach with random intrusions. We use the OMNET++
simulation environment and the next node selection will either use chaotic iterations or
the C++ rand() function (rand() % 2n) to produce a random number between 0
and 2n. For these set of simulations, 128 sensor nodes (therefore n = 7) are randomly
deployed in a 75m ∗ 75m area. Unless specified, sensors have an 36o AoV and sensor
node captures at the rate of 0.2fps. Each node starts with a battery level of 100 units
and taking 1 picture consummes 1 unit of battery. When a node Vi is selected to wake
up, it will be awake for Ti seconds. We set all Ti = T = 20s. According to the behav-
ior defined in section 5, before going to sleep after an activity period of eiT , Vi will
determine the next node to be waked up. It can potentially elect itself in which case Vi
stays active for at least another T period. The elected node can be already active, in
which case it simply increases its ei counter. We set about 50% of the sensor nodes to
be active initially (each sensor draws a random value between 0 and 1 and if the value
is greater than 0.5, it will be active). This initial threshold is tunable but we did not try
to vary this parameter in this paper. The results presented here have been averaged over
10 simulation runs with different initial seeds. Figure 1 shows the percentage of active
nodes. Both the chaotic and the standard rand() function have similar behavior: the
percentage of active nodes progressively decreases due to battery shortage.
To compare both approaches in term of surveillance quality, we record to stealth
time when intrusions are introduced in the area of interest. The stealth time is the time
during which an intruder can travel in the field without being seen. The first intrusion
starts at time 10s at a random position in the field. The scan line mobility model is
then used with a constant velocity of 5m/s to make the intruder moving to the right
part of the field. When the intruder is seen for the first time by a sensor, the stealth
time is recorded and the mean stealth time computed. Then a new intrusion appears
at another random position. This process is repeated until the simulation ends (i.e. no
more sensor nodes with energy). Figure 2 shows the mean stealth time over the whole
simulation duration. Figure 3 shows the same data but with a sliding window averaging
filter of 20 values. As the nodes are uniformly distributed in the area of interest, there
is a strong correlation between the percentage of active nodes and the stealth time
as it can be expected. The result we want to highlight here is that our chaotic node
selection approach has a similar level of performance in presence of random intrusions
than standard rand() function while providing a formal proof of non-prediction by
malicious intruders.
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Figure 2: Stealth time.
The last result we want to show is the energy consumption distribution. We recorded
every 10s the energy level of each sensor node in the field and computed the mean and
the standard deviation. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the standard deviation during
the network lifetime. We can see that the chaotic node selection provides a slightly
better distribution of activity than the standard rand() function.
8 Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper, a sleeping scheme for nodes has been proposed as an effective and secure
solution to the joint scheduling problem in surveillance applications using WVSNs. It
has been evaluated through theoretical and practical aspects of performance and se-
curity. As opposed to existing works, this scheduling scheme is not based only on
randomness, but on the mathematical theory of chaos too. By doing so, we reinforce
coverage and lifetime of the network, while obtaining a more secure scheme. We have
considered in this paper the case where the intruder is smart and active. Furthermore,
we have supposed that he can know the scheme and observe the behavior of the net-
work. We have shown that, in addition of being able to preserve WVSN lifetime and to
present comparable results against random attacks, our scheme is also able to withstand
such malicious attacks due to its unpredictable behavior.
In future work, we intend to enlarge the security field in WVSN-based video surveil-
lance, by making a classification of attacks that Oscar can achieve depending on the
data he has access to. Our desire is to distinguish between several levels of security
into each category of malicious attacks, from the weakest one to the strongest one.
Additionally, we will study more precisely the topological properties of the scheduling
scheme presented in this paper.
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